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EVALUATING LAND PRICES UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we present a novel application of the difference-in-
difference method to analyse the effect of regulation on 
agricultural land prices in the case of implementation of 
mandatory riparian buffer zones. The buffer zones are adjacent 
to streams and lakes and are designated as part of the Danish 
implantation of the EU Water Framework Directive. The buffer 
zone regulation existed from 2012 to 2015 when the regulation 
was suspended. Using a hedonic price model we do a difference-
and-difference estimation of the development in regional farm 
land prices for farms with land subject to the buffer zone 
regulation compared to farms not subject to buffer zones. A 
number of model specifications are tested but no significant effect 
on land prices of the buffer zone regulation is identified. This is 
explained by the fact, that the regulation was based on a subsidy 
scheme offering flat rate compensation to farmers obliged to 
establish buffer zones. Thus, results suggest that due to the 
subsidies, farmers’ expectations for the future economic rent are 
unchanged and, thus, no significant effects on the land prices are 
identified. 
 
 
Introduction 
Agricultural policy has been a pivotal issue in Europe at least since the foundation of the 
Treaty of Rome in the late 1950’s and hence the early days of the European Union. Price 
support for agricultural products to give farmers incentives to increase production ensuring 
self-sufficiency was one of the first policies in the European Community and was the 
predecessor of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). One of the objectives of the CAP 
from the early days to present is income support for farmers. Income support as price 
support or as decoupled payments is, though, to some degree capitalized into the 
constraining factor i.e. land.  
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Generally, all framework conditions for farmers are capitalized into the price of the 
constraining factor and for several policies - and especially in the case of agriculture - this 
is land prices. Also environmental policies are capitalized and possibly de-capitalizing 
land as a production factor if the policy is restricting farm production.  
 
In this paper we analyse the effect on agricultural land prices of the implementation of 
mandatory riparian buffer zones adjacent to streams and lakes designated as part of the 
implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive. The buffer zone regulation existed 
from 2012 to 2015 when it was suspended. As only farms with land designated as buffer 
zones are affected by the regulation we are able to isolate the effect on land prices. Using 
a hedonic price model we do a difference-and-difference estimation of the development in 
regional farm land prices for farms with land subject to the buffer zone regulation 
compared to farms not subject to buffer zones. 
 
The paper contributes with a novel application of the difference-in-difference method to 
empirically test the effect on an environmental legislation on the land prices. Difference-
in-difference is a quasi-experimental application of the hedonic method (Muehlenbachs, 
Spiller, and Timmins, 2015). The hedonic method is one of the three methods which have 
been used to assess the effect of government policies on the land prices (Karlsson and 
Nilsson, 2014). The hedonic method has been criticized for lack of theoretically derived 
functional specification (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009; Miranowski and Hammes, 1984), 
but none-the-less this method when applied - has been applied successfully when 
investigating the price effects on the housing market. 
 
The quasi-experimental part of the difference-in-difference method was applicable in this 
context because the legislation was concerned with spatially identifiable areas which were 
used to test whether the price development in the treated areas differed from the price 
development in surrounding areas. This method is robust to expectation error bias because 
the implicit assumptions are that the expectations to future price developments are the 
same in the studied areas as in the control group. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we do a review of the theoretical approaches 
to estimate the impact of economic framework conditions and the land prices. Then we 
present the principal aspects of the hedonic model and the identification strategy. Then the 
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data are described followed by the results of the estimations and test of different model 
specifications. Finally, we discuss the findings and present the conclusions. 
 
Framework conditions and the price on land 
Basically there are three different approaches to model agricultural land prices where the 
Present Value Model (PVM) is based on expected future cash flows recognizing also non-
agricultural cash flows as well as land appreciations (Burt, 1986; Castle and Hoch, 1982; 
Engsted, 1998; Featherstone and Baker, 1987; Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 1992; 
Melichar, 1979). Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) provide a good overview of developments 
in the present value model approach. The basic problem in this approach is that the 
revealed output prices are expected prices at the time of investment but evaluated with 
revealed prices. I.e. it was assumed that the farmers had rational expectations and/or 
perfect foresight and is thus subject to an expectation error bias (Goodwin et al., 2003). 
 
The second approach is equilibrium models where both supply side and demand side are 
estimated and the equilibrium price for farmland is reached. Tweeten and Martin (1966) 
is an early example of this approach using macrolevel data from 1923 through 1963. A 
more recent approach of this approach is Feichtinger and Salhofer (2016) where they use 
microdata on plot level to derive their reduced form pricing equation to estimate the 
capitalization of the subsidy before and after the Fischler-reform starting in 2005.  
 
The third approach is the hedonic type of model (Rosen, 1974) where the characteristics 
of farm land are attributed with a sales price. Miranowski and Hammes (1984) made an 
early contribution about the implicit prices of soil quality estimated in Iowa based on few 
land characteristics. Palmquist (1989) argue for using the hedonic approach in valuing 
farmland and in Palmquist and Danielson (1989) they estimate the value of erosion control 
and drainage improvements on the land value. Karlsson and Nilsson (2014) use this 
method to estimate Swedish land prices, but quite often this model is used to estimate the 
joint value of land in agricultural use and in non-agricultural use (Borchers, Ifft, and 
Kuethe, 2014; Guiling, Brorsen, and Doye, 2007; Henderson and Moore, 2005).   
 
As the capital value of agricultural land in most cases is the essential component for 
determining the price of agricultural land, it seems reasonable to expect that changes in 
the framework conditions, e.g. changed prices on sales products or policies affecting 
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output or production costs, - which change the expected Ricardian rent should results in 
changes in future land prices. 
 
The applicability of the difference-in-difference method is dependent on differences in the 
effect of the environmental regulation on farm land. Something needs to be treatment and 
something needs to be a control group. In this particular case it was the fraction of farms 
being influenced by the environmental regulation and a large share of farms in the control 
group. 
 
Hedonic Theory  
The hedonic method is well documented in numerous paper and textbooks, e.g., Palmquist 
(2005) and Bockstael and McConnell (2007). The hedonic price function is an equilibrium 
function created by sellers and buyers of properties seeking to maximize their profit and 
utility. In equilibrium, the sales price of any house is a function of its characteristics. The 
model is based on the assumption of weak separability, which means that the marginal rate 
of substitution between any two characteristics is independent of the level of all other 
characteristics. Thus, the hedonic model can provide an estimate of the implicit price of 
the marginal change of property characteristic (Palmquist, 1991, 1992). Only a handful of 
studies have attempted to go beyond implicit price and estimate Rosens (1974) second 
stage willingness to pay function.  
 
The hedonic price function is an equilibrium function that describes a single market. To 
estimate a hedonic price function on more than one market will result in biased estimates. 
Nevertheless, the theory provides almost no guidance to what a market consists of. The 
closest definition the literature provides is that a “true” market exists if market participants 
do not consider buying houses outside that particular market (Taylor, 2003).  
 
In this paper we will we will attempt to trace out the meaning of Willingness To Accept 
(WTA) for the impact of the buffer policy. We will treat the policy implementation as a 
non-marginal exogenous event in the farm land market which can be handled in quasi-
experimental research design in a difference-in-difference model setup (see section 
identification strategy). This approach ensures a strong identification strategy which 
reduces the problem of unobserved characteristics correlated with the riparian buffer zone 
variables. Previous studies have used the difference-in-difference method to estimate the 
capitalized effect of exogenous event in the housing market (Gibbons, 2015).  
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Identification strategy  
We use the difference-in-differences method to identify and isolate the effect of the buffer 
zone policy on farms. We do this by exploiting the variation across time and treatment 
between different farms.  The idea is to systematically compare farms with and without 
streams and lakes before and after the implementation of the buffer zone policy. If the 
buffer zone policy affects the farms negatively, we will find a price effect among farm 
properties that have lakes and stream and which are sold after the policy implementation.  
 
The difference-in-difference specification we apply in this paper can be written as follows: 𝑙𝑛(𝑃%) = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐵% + 𝛽-𝑇% + 𝛽/𝐵% ∗ 𝑇% +𝛽1𝑋% + δ + 𝜀% (1) 
 
Here, P, is the price of the i’th farm properties, β are parameters to be estimated, X is a 
vector of control variables accounting for numerous other relevant attributes of the farm.  
The amount of lakes and streams on the property is denoted B, and the introduction of the 
buffer policy is captured by the dummy variable T. The interaction between B% ∗ T%,  
captures the properties sold after the policy implementation which has lakes and stream 
that were buffered. Finally, ε is an i.i.d. error term.  The model was estimated using a 
Generalized Linear Model. To account for potential omitted variables, which are likely to 
be spatial in nature, we apply a fixed effect, δ, across regional provinces.  
 
Data 
The hedonic data in this analysis is uniquely rich in terms of variables and number of sales. 
The data covers all sold farm properties between 2010 and 2015. The data contain a large 
number of variables such as information of the size of the property, the age and size of 
buildings both production building and farm houses. The data also includes information 
about the number animals and type of animals on the property (not included in the sale 
price) as well as the overall concentrations of animals in the local areal. The soil quality, 
the amount of forest, lakes and streams and wetland areas are also accounted for in the 
dataset. 
 
The data were constructed based on the large Danish property OIS-database (OIS, 2017). 
The spatial outline of each sold property was merged with the spatial cadaster dataset 
based on the unique property key variable. The number of animals and soil quality were 
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extracted from the CHR-register and map of soil types (from 2014), respectively. The 
information about forest, lakes, streams, and wetland was added to the dataset using data 
from the national GeoDenmark database using GIS.  
 
The data include 7,603 sold farm properties where 3,114 properties are above 10 hectares, 
and 2,793 properties were cropped only with no registered animals. In total 2,365 traded 
properties in the dataset were affected by the buffer zone policy equal to roughly 30% of 
the entire dataset. All the transactions are marked based thus excluding family sales and 
closed auctions. The survey period from 2010 to 2015 was a relative price stable period 
relative to the years before where the financial crises adjusted the prices notably. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Description Unit Mean Variation  Min Max 
Property size hectare 19.05 28.70 0.501 271.1 
Sold in 2011 0/1 0.15 0.357 0 1 
Sold in 2012 0/1 0.163 0.37 0 1 
Sold in 2013 0/1 0.17 0.376 0 1 
Sold in 2014 0/1 0.174 0.379 0 1 
Sold in 2015 0/1 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Nordjylland region 0/1 0.272 0.445 0 1 
Sydjylland region 0/1 0.279 0.448 0 1 
Østjylland region 0/1 0.202 0.401 0 1 
Primary pig farm  0/1 0.032 0.175 0 1 
Primary cattle farm 0/1 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Primary other animals 0/1 0.026 0.16 0 1 
Forest Hectare 1.506 4.297 0 89.12 
Wetland Hectare 0.459 1.602 0 40.39 
Lake  Hectare 0.101 0.547 0 20.82 
Good soil quality  Hectare 2.98 11.994 0 220 
No building 0/1 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Number of cattle Number 4.5 31.86 0 525.7 
Number of pigs Number 5.55 44.24 0 856.1 
Number of other animals Number 0.56 8.409 0 300 
Production building  m2 1,273 2,444 0 54,387 
Farm house  m2 183.8 140.5 0 1,652 
 
 
Buffer zone variables  
Up until the implementation of the buffer zone policy, there was uncertainty about the 
actual extent of the buffer zones. We therefore initially looked into several different 
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definitions of buffer zones around water elements like lakes, streams, and wetlands. In 
table 2 we present a descriptive statistics of variables that we used in the difference-in-
difference model.  According to the policy, the class of lake and stream were a key 
determinant for buffer zone requirement. Only lakes and streams classified as being natural 
were required to implement a buffer zone.  
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of buffer zone variables 
Description Unit 
averag
e 
Variatio
n 
Mi
n Max 
Stream  
m/hectar
e 18.94 29.31 0 
332.
3 
Lakes 
m/hectar
e 7.41 19.74 0 
492.
9 
Streams  with buffer zone requirement  
m/hectar
e 8.82 18.07 0 
283.
6 
Lakes with buffer zone requirement 
m/hectar
e 6.29 16.62 0 
228.
0 
 
Results  
The model estimation of the difference-in-difference hedonic model was estimated using 
three different samples; one with the full dataset, one where properties under 5 hectares 
were removed and one where properties under 10 hectares were removed. This objective 
of subsampling the dataset was to discover whether price drivers were different for 
different sizes of properties. 
  
The models include more than 25 variables which capture part of the variation of the 
transaction price of the farm properties. The most important price driver was the size of 
the property. We, therefore, adjust property size to vary over time. The baseline of the 
model was a property with average or below average soil quality sold in 2010.     
The three models explained between 73 to 79 percent of the variation. The variables 
capture most of the variation in the transaction price. The explanation drops as the sample 
is reduced which essentially means that we are able to capture the additional variation 
introduced by the small properties. This, however, does not imply that the full model is 
better. R-square essentially explains how the model captures more relative variation. By 
introducing more variation – adding small properties to the sample – and then controlling 
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for it we increase the relative explained variation, but at the same time, we can claim to 
improve the model estimation.   
 
The model estimate shows that the price drivers of the full model compared with the model 
that includes properties larger than 10 hectares is different for many variables. Forest 
reduces the price of the property by around DKK1 53,000 per hectare across all three 
models. Properties with streams and lakes that are buffer zone required have a lower price 
premium per meter per hectare. However, only the parameter estimates related to lakes are 
significant. The parameter estimates that capture properties sold after the policy 
implementation which have buffer zoned required areas are all negative but far from 
significant. 
 
Table 3 – Model estimation 
Model Unit 
Full  
Properties 
>5 ha 
Properties  
>10 ha 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hectare DKK/ hectare 141,454*** 138,103*** 134,261*** 
(4,147) (7,824) (8,441) 
Hectare, 
supplement 2011 
DKK/hectare 9,673** 12,441 17,553 
(4,811) (14,866) (16,950) 
Hectare, 
supplement 2012 
DKK/hectare 10,365** 12,603 14,994 
(4,525) (10,385) (11,496) 
Hectare, 
supplement 2013 
DKK/hectare 16,341*** 18,135* 20,312* 
(4,492) (9,458) (10,526) 
Hectare, 
supplement 2014 
DKK/hectare 9,981** 12,065 14,120 
(4,549) (7,942) (8,821) 
Hectare, 
supplement 2011 
DKK/hectare 22,763*** 27,215*** 32,594*** 
(4,471) (9,884) (11,094) 
Hectare, 
supplement for 
Nordjylland region 
DKK/hectare 9,053*** 9,064 9,204 
(2,728) (7,559) (7,577) 
Hectare, 
supplement for 
Sydjylland region 
DKK/hectare -19,148*** -19,136*** -19,572*** 
(2,569) (6,013) (6,010) 
Hectare, 
supplement for 
Østjylland region 
DKK/hectare 35,129*** 35,093*** 34,973*** 
(3,126) (11,088) (11,157) 
Hectare, DKK/hectare -52,690*** -52,266*** -52,156*** 
                                               
1 One Euro is approximately 7,4 DKK.  
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supplement for 
forest (8,598) (17,441) (17,764) 
Hectare, 
supplement for good 
soil quality 
DKK/hectare 46,462*** 46,099*** 45,603*** 
(3,229) (10,037) (10,059) 
Primary pig 
production 
DKK/AU1 -4,053 -3,214 -4,317 
(2,540) (7,336) (8,137) 
Primary cattle 
production 
DKK/AU1 15,857*** 16,412*** 17,505*** 
(2,398) (4,216) (4,345) 
Primary other animal 
production 
DKK/AU1 27,603*** 44,094*** 53,564*** 
(6,862) (10,176) (12,329) 
Production building DKK/m2 266*** 287*** 368*** 
(19,7) (54,9) (62,8) 
Animal  
concentration * 
production building, 
Pig production 
AU1*m2 4,903*** 4,739** 5,115*** 
(0,499) (1,874) (1,966) 
Animal  
concentration * 
production building, 
cattle production 
AU1*m2 -1,2477*** -1,3505** -2*** 
(0,379) (0,572) (1) 
Animal  
concentration * 
production building, 
other animal 
AU1*m2 -2,84*** -6,59*** -9,16*** 
(0,65) (0,90) (1,83) 
Animal  
concentration * 
production building, 
Pig production 
(AU1*m2)^2 -
0,0000004*** -0,0000004
** -0,0000004*** 
(0,00000004) (0,0000002) (0,0000002) 
Animal  
concentration * 
production building, 
cattle production 
(AU1*m2)^2 0,0000001*** 0,0000001*** 0,0000001*** 
(0,00000002) (0,00000003) (0,00000003) 
Animal  
concentration * 
production building, 
other animal 
(AU1*m2)^2 0,0000001** 0,000001*** 0,000001*** 
(0,00000005) (0,0000001) (0,0000003) 
Farmhouse size DKK/m2 2,570*** 4,093*** 4,681*** 
(595) (647) (1,168) 
Farmhouse size  DKK/m2^2 -1,90*** -3,20*** -3,46** 
(0,69) (0,78) (1,42) 
Size supplement 
for no buildings 
DKK/hectare 33,930*** 34,153* 45,718* 
(10,191) (20,033) (23,791) 
No buildings DKK 480,715*** 743,207*** 578,345* 
(149,389) (121,227) (298,717) 
DKK/m/hectare 125 -1,315 -4,503 
11 
 
Stream (buffer 
zone required) (4,024) (1,565) (3,108) 
Lake (buffer zone 
required) 
DKK/m/hectare -9,954 -20,812** -28,795** 
(25,516) (9,086) (12,983) 
Stream (buffer 
zone required after 
policy 
implementation) 
DKK/m/hectare -13,310 -3,901 -507 
(33,821) (16,382) (19,196) 
Lake (buffer zone 
required after 
policy 
implementation) 
DKK/m/hectare -491 -1,279 -2,907 
(4,875) (1,958) (4,151) 
2011 DKK -158,536 -376,175** -807,058*** 
(139,656) (158,214) (299,927) 
2012 DKK -163,199 -309,095*** -487,425** 
(139,562) (113,998) (207,876) 
2013 DKK -181,979 -296,447*** -463,935** 
(139,067) (112,542) (204,962) 
2014 DKK -162,603 -309,616*** -482,159*** 
(138,235) (90,569) (165,550) 
2015 DKK -348,512** -659,231*** -1,096,770*** 
(137,185) (122,338) (220,816) 
Constant DKK 85,678 -12,861 -90,486 
(129,819) (108,636) (199,584) 
Observations  7,603 4,776 3,114 
McFadden R2  0.79 0.76 0.73 
Note: *p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
1) Animal Units 
Discussion and conclusions 
The results from the analyses show that although the model explains a significant part of 
the variations in the land prices, no significant effect of the buffer zones are identified. An 
explanation could be that farmers do not foresee that the presence of buffer zones located 
on an agricultural estate affects the expected future economic rent (including 
compensation). Why this explanation seems to be reasonable will be expanded in the 
following.  
 
During the preparation of the policies leading to implementation of the buffer zones, the 
effects on the farmers’ economic performance were heavily debated. Following this 
discussion, it was decided to offer a subsidy to compensate farmers for the economic loss 
resulting from appointment of buffer zones. The subsidies were graduated between land 
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in rotation and permanent grassland. For land in rotation the subsidy in 2012-prises 
amounted to DKK 2,100 per hectare per year and for permanent grassland it amounted to 
DKK 1,200 per hectare per year. The subsidy was based on the average economic rent in 
2008-2010 on the two types of land use (NaturErhvervstyrelsen, 2013). Further, the land 
appointed as buffer zones were also eligible for direct payments under pillar 1 of the EU 
CAP of DKK 2,864 per hectare per year. The total yearly payment per hectare of buffer 
zone, thus amounts to the sum of the subsidy and the direct payment, i.e. DKK 4,860 on 
land formerly in rotation and DKK 4,070 for permanent grassland. This should be 
compared with the expected short term loss between DKK 1,100 and 5,900 estimated by 
Jacobsen (2015). Here it should be noted that the long term effect is expected to be lower 
as farmers are able to adjust semi fixed and fixed costs in the long run. 
 
In this light is seem reasonable to expect that farmers’ expected economic loss resulting 
from having buffer zones on their estate would have been low. This together with the 
political uncertainty connected with the expectations of the buffer zone regulation being 
suspended in case of a change in Government adds to the explanation that the 
nonsignificant effect of buffer zones in the estimations reflects a realistic expectation that 
buffer zones would not have a long term – or short term – effect on the economic outcome 
from the agricultural activities. 
 
Even though this case did not give statistically significant results from the application of 
the difference-in-difference approach, it has the potential for yielding solid information 
the about effect of regulation on land prices without the expectation of error biases. This, 
though, requires natural experiments involving a treatment and control group.  
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